Elements of "civil death" were put into heavy practice in the reconstruction era, as the 
Introduction
Felony disenfranchisement is not a new idea. Criminals in Rome and Greece were not permitted to participate in many civic activities, including voting. "Civil death," the term used to describe the loss of civil privileges, spread throughout Europe after Rome's fall. When English colonists arrived in the Americas, English common law traditions were brought along. However, many other elements of the so called "civil death" were abolished-entering into contracts, or prohibiting the guilty party from inheriting or passing down an estate, for example-though felons and exfelons voting and public office holding privileges remain. Disenfranchisement has since then evolved, and has been codified into legislation, written into the U.S. Constitution and even legitimized at the Supreme Court level through court cases.
More than five million U.S. citizens are estimated to be unable to vote due to state felony disenfranchisement policies. Disenfranchisement severely affects some communities' political 1 voices, especially those of minority groups. According to the data compiled by the Sentencing Project, 2.5% of the white population is unable to vote, compared to 7.66% of otherwise eligible black voters' population. If prison populations and felony convictions continue to rise, fewer 2 groups will be able to vote. Minority voices are already so underrepresented in legislative bodies, especially within singlemember districts (or constituencies). Disenfranchisement September, 2015. 3 Electoral districts that return one office holder to a legislative body that has multiple members. disproportionately affects minorities, as it further denies them the right to have their voices heard on important policy issues that will, in turn, also harm their interests in public, and private, life.
For the entire U.S., Uggen and Manza estimate that "the disenfranchised population is composed of approximately 35 percent exfelons, 28 percent probationers, 9 percent parolees, but only 27 percent prison and jail inmates," meaning that of the 5.8 million disenfranchised 4 felons, the majority (approximately 77 percent) are no longer serving prison sentences.
Currently, there are more black men in prison than ever before; there are more black men disenfranchised today than in 1870 when the Fifteenth Amendment was passed. With such high 5 numbers of disenfranchised people, most notably people of color, it is surprising to find that this practice of "civil death" has continued into the twenty first century, especially after the fierce fights of recent history by those attempting to gain suffrage rights.
What scholars in political science still need to know is why civil death has continued to be applied in so extreme a way to convicts in Iowa, Florida, and Kentucky-even after the reconstruction era has long since ended. Particularly troublesome is that Iowa, Florida, and Kentucky seem to be the extreme outliers in that they impose what are effectively lifetime disenfranchisement policies on their felons. Why is it, then, that these three states continue to impose harsh restrictions when the rest of the states are moving away from civil death as retribution for crimes? Some scholars theorize that some state legislatures may have racial and political motivations for the continued practice of long term civil death. Recent acknowledgments of de facto racial bias in the application of sentencing leading to large death legislation in the majority of states is becoming less extreme and the long term loss of franchise rights is becoming far less common, despite a select few continuing to impose long term disenfranchisement.
The States and Their Disenfranchisement Policies
Each state has considerable autonomy in enacting their own disenfranchisement 
Any person who, on election day:
(1) is a citizen of the United States; (2) is a resident of the state of Vermont; (3) has taken the voter's oath; * [and] * (4) is 18 years of age or more ; and (5) is not serving a sentence or on probation or parole as the result of a felony conviction may register to vote in the town of his or her residence in any election held in a political subdivision of this state in which he or she resides. Empirical analysis shows that the groups most likely to vote are those with education, power, and social privilege. However, as Lanning points out, the groups who should be "least satisfied with the status quo, the poor, the less educated, and the socially marginalized" are less 29 Ibid. Section 6A provides: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof." 30 Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute provides: "A civil right is an enforceable right or privilege, which if interfered with by another gives rise to an action for injury. Examples of civil rights are freedom of speech, press, and assembly; the right to vote; freedom from involuntary servitude; and the right to equality in public places." Last accessed June 9, 2016. 31 Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza, "Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States." American Sociological Review (2002): 794. 32 Ibid. likely to vote than groups with social capital. As Shatema Threadcraft notes, however, a fair 33 assessment of the practices of these marginalized groups-especially black women-has to be considered within the context of both "historical events and contemporary circumstances." So, 34 while some might scoff and brush off the fact that these groups do not vote, or only turn out when it benefits them most, there is a legitimate and deeper reasoning for this in practice and functionally.
Minorities and poor groups are being systematically excluded from the franchise guaranteed to citizens of the U.S, so it is no wonder that these groups would not find voting The disenfranchisement of criminals is a punitive measure taken by states and applied in a racially biased way, and the argument for any restrictions of civil rights is essentially punitive. Democrats; 8 as Republicans; and 10 as Independents). It was also found that six had never 41 been able to vote: they were already convicted of felonies by the age of 18. Additionally, the men interviewed had only a slightly lower rate of voting than the national average prior to losing their voting privileges, but fiftyone said they would vote if they "were legally permitted to do so." When asked what the exoffenders thought the purpose of disenfranchising felons was, 42 most recognized that it was a punishment, but felt that the punishment extended for too long, or that it did not make much sense, simply stating that "'[it's] part of the punishment. They don't want us to be part of their society anymore. '" 43 There is an identity associated with exoffenders that outside communities place upon them: that they are uneducated, that they are nothing more than criminals, that they are subhuman. But, the men and women subjected to prison and criminal stigma are not simply creations of their own choice. Tommie Shelby writes that "a person's life prospects are [not] completely determined b their particular social circumstances he or she is born into… but each individual's life prospects are obviously deeply shaped by a social structure that he or she did not choose." There is an awareness of their situation that most may not attribute to exoffenders (as 44 40 This is somewhat problematic as it discludes an entire class of people from a sample; the men were recruited from postincarceration communities and would appear to be selfselecting. Additionally, the men were required to have finished all of the terms of their sentences, including parole and probation. 41 Bryan Lee Miller, and Laura E. Agnich. "Unpaid debt to society: exploring how exfelons view restrictions on voting rights after the completion of their sentence." Contemporary Justice Review (2016) 
Conclusion
The right to franchise and hold office are basic fundamental rights, rights that are ardently protected by the constitution and by the U.S. Supreme Court. Suffrage is the simplest way for citizens to have their voices heard in important policy decisions. When such massive amounts of people are losing the right to vote and to hold office, the system becomes less democratic. When the autonomy of millions of people is violated by the restriction of the suffrage right, it should be seen as suspect; when the suffrage rights of an equally large number of people are revoked for life, and autonomy in the government is no longer feasible for them, democracy is no longer functioning as it should. However, when people discuss the problems with the U.S. political system, they are focused on the twoparty system. Felony and exfelon disenfranchisement, however, remain largely out of the public eye.
The people that are aware of exfelon disenfranchisement, and of the effects, tend to disagree with imposing these harsh restrictions, especially the imposed long term and lifetime restrictions. Indeed, the states have been moving away from strict disenfranchisement policy since the 1940s, and when legislation fails to recognize the problematic application, the state's governors have been taking action through executive order to make the changes necessary to create a more equitable situation for all. When Governor Terry McAuliffe (Virginia) signed the executive orders to reinstate voting rights for felons in Virginia, state leadership commended the action citing biases in the application of justice and the state's history of racial discrimination that plagued Virginia. Likewise, the former Governor of Kentucky, Steve Beshear, signed his executive order under the presumption that the disenfranchisement policies are harmful to the people that are subjected to them. To have officials in power recognizing the inherent bias and harmful nature of this type of legislation, even when it has been shown to benefit them, demonstrates just how objectionable these policies are.
A conviction status in every state means legal discrimination in housing, benefits, and employment. In many of them it means a loss of voice and, feasibly, of citizenship in that one of the hallmark of citizenship in the United States is marked by the protection of civil rights, of which the right to suffrage is a part. When the basic rights of so many citizens are being denied because of crimes that are so rarely violent in nature, and especially those crimes that are theorized and understood by many scholars to be racially biased, in application, it is time for the U.S. to reexamine its use of an antiquated system of punitive punishment. If this cannot be accomplished via the channels of legislative action, then it must be fought in the courts.
The Supreme Court has the legal authority to rule unconstitutional as needed, the current system of disenfranchisement policy in the U.S.; they need only to apply the correct test when the right case comes across their desks. The Court need only listen to the current scholarship and recognize the legislative changes the states have made since the 1940s to know that the standard for decency has changed fundamentally over time. Indeed, more and more states are softening their disenfranchisement legislation and permitting the restoration of voting rights earlier in the phases of passing through the justice carceral system, while a select few are holding tight to their legally protected racist legislation.
It is possible that over time the last few holdouts will join the rest of the states in relaxing their felon and exfelon disenfranchisement legislation. But it has taken the states 70 years to alter legislation enough to get us here today. To "wait and see" what the final few states will act, and to wait much longer, is to admit that the lives of those most affected by this institution do not matter as much as the racist principles of a small fraction of outlier states; it is a violation of the very constitution we so ardently defend and adhere to. That the U.S. Constitution provides a bit of leeway in state's rights to disenfranchise its criminals does not mean that it protects to do so in so egregious a way. The Supreme Court of the United States has the power to interpret the Constitution and legislative rules, and it has been demonstrated here and in other scholarly work that the Supreme Court has the precedential tools necessary to legitimately interpret the current legislation in Kentucky, Iowa, and Florida as unconstitutional. They need only accept the overwhelming evidence offered to them.
